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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of CEO equity-based compensation (EBC) on firm value.  In 
particular, we study the interaction between EBC and the percentage of independent directors as 
well as the interaction between EBC and managerial entrenchment.  Our findings suggest a 
positive relation between firms’ value and EBC.  Further, we show that the percentage of 
independent directors has a positive impact on the marginal effect of EBC on firm value.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he agency problem stems from the fact that managers and stockholders might have conflicting goals 
within the same firm. Whether rewarding managers positively affects their performance and thus the 
firm value or not has been a controversial issue on which several academic research have addressed. 
 
Previous research on the effect of equity-based compensation (EBC) on firm value reached different 
conclusions. Results of previous scholarly work ranged from a positive relation to no significant relation -with the 
firm value being proxied by Tobin’s Q. This paper, thus, investigates whether equity-based compensation will help 
to align management and shareholders’ objectives.  Our empirical results suggest that equity-based compensation 
does have a direct and indirect positive effect on firm value. Research findings also show that the marginal negative 
effect of managerial entrenchment on firm value will be reduced for firms that are characterized with high EBC. 
Furthermore, an increase in the percentage of independent directors increases the positive marginal effect of EBC on 
shareholders wealth. 
 
Using an interaction variable between equity-based compensation (EBC) and the percentage of independent 
directors suggests that when CEO’s are rewarded through equity-based compensation, the marginal impact of this 
EBC on firm value increases. 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The performance of any firm is affected by many important managerial decisions of which how to price 
goods, which markets to enter, and how to face competition. The quality of such decisions doesn’t depend merely on 
the managers’ ability but also on the incentives they have to create value for stockholders as seen by Byrd, Parrino, 
and Pritsch (1998).  
 
The fact that managers and stockholders might have conflicting goals gives rise to the agency problem. 
Byrd, Parrino, and Pritsch (1998) document the four problems arise because of the agency problem: the effort, 
horizon, differential risk preference, and asset use problems. They state that an effective compensation contract will 
be able to provide managers with incentives to make decisions that the stockholders will want and thus minimize the 
conflict between the two parties. According to Hallak (2011), the general agency theory suggests that the manager 
should be provided with equity-based compensation to align his interests with those of the firm owners. Equity-
based compensation types include stock options, warrants, employee shares, and others according to Hojen (2007) 
T 
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and are viewed as a means to motivate managers to satisfy stockholders interests since it results in a share of 
ownership between both. 
 
Supporters of the use of these equity-based grants as an incentive tool argue that these grants will result in 
increased firm performance while opponents argue that the positive effects of these programs are highly over-stated 
and their costs are higher than the achieved results. 
 
As of the mid-1990s, one-third of total (U.S.) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation was in the 
form of stock option awards, up from one fifth during the 1980s according to Hall and Liebman (1998) and Murphy 
(1998). Also, upon examining 544 proxy statements for firms with CEOs listed in the 1994 Forbes compensation 
survey, 66.5% of these CEO’s were found to receive incentives in the form of option grants during the year 1993 
according to Byrd, Parrino, and Pritsch. In addition, large firms rely more on CEO stock-option awards compared 
with cash compensation based on a study made by Yermack (1995). Thus, there is a wide use of equity-based 
incentive compensation in the US firms-with two kinds of audience: supporters and opponents. This explains why 
for years researchers have been interested in studying the general agency theory. Thus, many empirical studies were 
published in this manner-but were of contradictory results. 
 
Among the studies whose results support the general agency theory we find the study of  Mehran (1995) 
who documents a positive relationship between the percentage of equity-based compensation the manager receives 
and the performance at manufacturing firms. Similarly, using a large sample of U.S. firms over the 1992–97 period, 
Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) obtains results that provide strong support for the predictions of optimal CEO 
stock option, restricted stock awards, and their direct effect on firm performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
also document a positive relationship between managerial stock ownership (and thus stock-based compensation) and 
firm performance; even though the performance wasn’t monotonic. Smith (1990) and Kaplan (1989)   also report 
direct evidence of the incentive effects of large stockholdings on operational efficiency. Defusco, Johnson, and Zohn 
(1990) report an increase in shareholder wealth surrounding the announcement of an executive stock option plan. 
Milkovich and Gerhart (1990) use longitudinal data on about 14,000 top and middle-level managers and 200 
organizations and found that contingent pay in the form of equity-based compensation was positively associated 
with firm performance enhancement. Hillegeist and Penalva (2003) perform tests separately for the top-5 executives 
and all other employees. The relation between firm performance, proxied by abnormal future returns, Tobin Q , and 
future return on firm’s assets , and the level of performance used , the authors provide an evidence of a positive and 
significant relation between better firm performance and option incentives . This conclusion holds for executives 
and employees.   
 
On the other hand, Warren Buffet, one of the leading opponents of this view, believes “Although options 
can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate top managers, they are more often wildly 
capricious in their distribution of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for shareholder”. 
Various studies were performed that support this point of view. Yermack (1995) document a negative association 
between incentive-intensity and the firm’s investment opportunities and performance. Hojen (2007) finds that no 
significant effects from the equity-based compensation contracts in the short-term perspective exist. The same result 
is reached when studying the effects of the equity-based compensation contracts in the long-term perspective except 
that abnormal returns were noted in the fourth and twelfth months.  Hojen (2007) concludes that no significant 
difference in operational performance (measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q) was noted comparing pre-adoption 
and post-adoption of the compensation plan. Similarly, the study of Jensen and Murphy (1990) proves that there is a 
lack of strong pay-for-performance incentives for CEOs and thus performance-related compensations of all types 
have no positive effect on the actual performance. They report that the manager’s share of increases in the firm 
value averaged around 3%. In later work, Hall and Liebman (1998) find that by more exhaustively incorporating the 
value of executive stock options into the calculations, this pecentage increases, but remains relatively low. Equally, 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) find that the use of options is successful in retaining employees and creating value as 
reflected by positive abnormal returns. Furthermore, the author provides evidence on value creation through the use 
of stock option to deal with firm’s financial constraints. However, the use of stock options was not as successful in 
high gross firms. 
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The review of the above studies shows that no empirical consensus on the form of the relationship (whether 
positive or negative) exists between equity-based compensation for managers and the firm-value and managerial 
performance. This lack of consensus creates the foundation of our research as we shall attempt to revisit this issue to 
explore further the reality of this relationship which will enable us to contribute to this debate. 
 
Does a relationship actually exist between CEO equity-based compensation (EBC) and firm value? This 
research will try to figure out whether awarding CEO’s with equity-based compensation increases Tobin’s Q (firm 
value) as concluded by some researchers or not-as reached by others. 
 
H01: There is no relationship between CEO  equity based compensation  and firm-value 
 
Another question that will be addressed in this research is whether a change in the percentage of 
independent directors will cause a change in the marginal effect of EBC on firm value or not. When this percentage 
increases beyond a certain (average) level, does the effect of EBC on firm-value change? If it does, does it become 
weaker or stronger? 
 
H02: The percentage of independent directors does not cause a change in the marginal effect of EBC on firm 
value. 
 
Finally, we will find out whether the level of entrenchment and its marginal impact on firm performance 
will be affected by EBC of CEO. 
 
 
DATA & DESCRIPTIVES 
 
This paper utilizes data from three major databases, namely, CompuStat that provides information on 
firm’s financials, IRRC data base which provides information related to external measures of governance, and 
Execucomp database that furnishes information on CEO compensation package and duality. The data collected 
covers the period from 1994 till 2009.  The definition of the variables used in this research paper is as follows: 
 
Tobin’s Q:  (MVE + PS + BVINV + LTDEBT + CL – CA)/TA  
 
where MVE is the value of common stocks at the end of the year. BVINV is the book value of the inventory. 
LTDEBT refers to the book value of the long-term debt. CL stands for current liabilities while CA stands for current 
assets. TA is the book value of the Total Assets in the firm. 
 
Sales-to-Assets (sales_at): The ratio of the firms’ sales to assets.  ROA1: The ratio of EBITDA/Assets. 
EBITDA is a shortcut for Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization.  EBC: The amount paid to 
the firms’ CEO as equity-based compensation during the current year.  RDExp: Research and Development 
expenses for the previous year.  E: Level of Entrenchment. It takes a value between 0 and 6.  Board Size: The 
number of directors serving on the board.  % of Independent Directors:  The percentage of external directors serving 
on the board.  CEO Chair: A dummy states whether the CEO is also a chair. It takes a value of 1 if CEO is also a 
chair and 0 otherwise.  IndepDum: % of independent directors dummy that takes a value of 1 if the % is more than 
the sample mean value and 0 otherwise.  EBC IndepDum: Interaction variable which is the product of EBC and % of 
independent variables dummy.  EBCDumEIndex: Interaction variable which is the product of EBC Dummy and E-
Index. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
The first model simply attempts to answer the first research question on the nature of relationship between 
shareholders wealth, proxied by Tobin Q, and CEO equity based compensation. Table 1 summarizes the results of 
Panel data with industry fixed effect. Explanatory variables include research and development, sales-to-assets ratio, 
return on assets, equity-based compensation, E-index, percentage of independent directors, board size, and year 
dummy variables which are not reported for space convenience. A significant negative relation at 1% level of 
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significance exists between Tobin’s Q and sales-to-assets ratio, the E-Index, and percentage of independent 
directors. A significant negative relation at 5% level of significance also exists between Tobin’s Q and board size. 
On the other hand, a positive and significant relation at less than 1% level of significance exists between Tobin’s Q 
and spending on research and development, return on assets, and CEO equity-based compensation. Thus, our 
findings suggest a direct relation between CEO equity based compensation and firm value. We can thus reject 
Hypothesis H01. 
 
Table 1 
Panel Data with Industry Fixed Effect 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Sig. 
 (Constant) 1.319 .000 
RDexp 8.764 .000 
sales_at -0.190 .000 
ROA1 6.653 .000 
EBC 2.124E-5 .000 
E -0.119 .000 
Percentage_Independent -0.008 .000 
BoardSize -0.090 0.03 
Note. Dependent Variable: Tobin Q. Year dummy variables are included but not reported. 
 
 
While keeping the same set of control variables, Table 2 represents the Panel data results with industry 
fixed effect, of the interaction between EBC and the percentage of independent directors dummy. Sales-to-assets, 
managerial entrenchment, board size, and percentage of independent directors have maintained their marginal, 
negative and significant impact on firm value. On the other hand, investment in research and development, rate of 
return on assets and, and EBC kept their significant and positive relation with firm value. From Table 6, we note that 
the coefficient of the interaction variable is positive showing that when the percentage of independent directors is 
above the sample mean, the marginal effect of CEO equity based compensation (EBC) on firm value increases. We 
may, therefore, conclude that the percentage of independent directors does cause a positive change in the marginal 
effect of EBC on firm value. 
 
Table 2 
Panel Data with Industry Fixed Effect 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Sig. 
 (Constant) 1.307 .000 
RDexp 9.432 .000 
sales_at -0.1924 .000 
ROA1 6.714 .000 
EBC 2.102E-5 .000 
e -0.119 .000 
BoardSize -0.089 .022 
Percentage_Independent -.008 .000 
InteractionEBCIndepDum 8.912E-6 .002 
Note. Dependent Variable: Tobin Q. Year dummy variables are included but not reported. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARK 
 
Efforts to moderate the negative impact of agency problems on shareholders wealth has always been a 
major challenge for policy makers, practitioners, and academicians.  One way to mitigate this problem is to design 
and provide equity-based compensation (EBC) packages to top management. This is expected to improve managers’   
performance and thus increase the firm value. Whether this strategy successfully aligns management and 
shareholders objectives or not is still controversial. This paper studies the marginal effect of EBC on shareholders 
wealth,  and whether or not this marginal effect changeswith the percentage of independent directors 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – December 2012 Volume 10, Number 12 
© 2012 The Clute Institutehttp://www.cluteinstitute.com/ 693 
Our findings support the existence of a relationship between CEO equity-based compensation (EBC) and 
firm performance. Empirical evidence shows a positive and significant relation between this EBC and firm value.  
 
We also investigated the change in the marginal effect of EBC on firm value as a result of change in the 
percentage of independent directors in that firm. Our findings suggest that alignment of owners and management 
objectives, using EBC packages, is more evident in firms with higher participation of independent directors; that is, 
the positive effect on firm value increases as the percentage of independent directors increases. 
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